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ABSTRACT 
 
This research investigates the power use in self and collective interests of retailers and small apparel 
suppliers’ relationships. Our findings highlighted that power use of fast fashion retailers in self-interest and 
collective interest related goals are evident mainly in the areas of capability development, production 
processes and innovation in asymmetric relationships with Turkish apparel suppliers.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This research aims to contribute to relationship marketing theory in industrial contexts by investigating the 
use of power in self and collective interests of retailers and small apparel suppliers in asymmetric 
relationships in Turkey.  
The increasing importance of power as a determining concept in supply chain relationships has recently 
received much attention from researchers (Nyaga et al., 2013, Hingley et al., 2015). For several decades 
researchers have been interested in understanding the structure and dynamics of power, Cox et al., (2001) 
stated that power deserves to be the central construct in buyer-seller relationships. Moreover, the role and 
significance of power in supply chain relationships have been highlighted by many researchers (Benton and 
Maloni 2005, Kumar, 2005). However, power is still an elusive concept and the concept of power is still 
underdeveloped area and its scope is still too narrow (Hingley et al., 2015).  
The concept of power is widespread and it can be easily observed in supplier-retailer studies because in 
asymmetric exchange relationships, retailers are the powerful side and they are able to set the rules of the 
game (Hingley et al., 2015). A number of researchers in supply chains (Nyaga et al., 2013, Rindt and 
Mouzas, 2015) have explored power asymmetry. In asymmetric supplier-buyer relationships, the powerful 
partner applies its power in two main areas: the strategic and operational areas of the weaker party. This 
means that the weaker party accepts the control of the powerful party in its business activities in both areas 
(Johnsen and Ford, 2008). Furthermore, power asymmetry in supplier-buyer relationships affects weaker 
party’s adaptive and collaborative behaviour, and it may provide more chance to the powerful partner to take 
opportunities in the relationships (Nyaga et al., 2013).  
However, it has been highlighted that existing models and classifications do not sufficiently capture the 
characteristics in buyer–supplier relationships (Holmlund, 2004). Therefore, further research is needed to 
fully comprehend the constructions and methods involved in buyer–supplier relationships (Munksgaard, 
Johnsen and Patterson, 2015).  
This research has important implications for fast fashion suppliers’ managers, which are regularly dealing 
with power use by large buyers in their self and collective interests in relationships because retailers have an 
increasing power in the market (Hines and McGovan, 2005). There is still a lack of research in the apparel 
supply chain relationships in relation to increasing exertion of power by retailers (Oxborrow and Brindley, 
2014). Furthermore, power use influence business activities of small supplier firms by restricting, limiting, 
attracting and encouraging them (Pulles 2014). Therefore, this study has focused on how self and collective 
interests are evident and employed in order to develop long term and beneficial co-operations. The following 
research question has been addressed in this study: 
How fast fashion retailers use power in self and collective interests in asymmetric relationships with small 
apparel suppliers based in Turkey?  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
The Increasing importance of power as a determining concept in supply chain relationships has recently 
received much attention from researchers (Nyaga et al., 2013, Pulles et al., 2014, Maglaras et al., 2015, 
Chicksand, 2015, Hingley et al., 2015). For a several decades a lot of researchers have been interested in 
understanding the structure and dynamics of power, Cox et al., (2001) stated that power deserves to be the 
central construct in buyer-seller relationships.  
Lacoste and Johnsen (2014) have stated that power can also be used by suppliers by focusing on business 
processes of customers and creating inter-dependencies that is so called countervailing power. However, a 
negative effect of power asymmetry was not an agreed view universally. There is also a body of research 
that highlights positives of power asymmetry. Hingley (2005) argues that asymmetry need not be a barrier to 
develop a relationship; indeed, the relationship may provide mutual benefits, which override any possible 
negative effects of the power asymmetry.  
Meehan and Wright (2012) have reported that there is a consensus among authors, there is a dramatic swift 
in the balance in power, from suppliers to retailers. This may have some consequences for small suppliers by 
affecting their competitive advantage (Hines and McGovan, 2005). This could be disadvantaged in deals 
with large retailers (Hingley, 2005). The recent findings shows that move into private label goods, produce 
exclusively for retailers. In such conditions, the retailers take control of branding over the supplier (Meehan 
and Wright, 2012). 
Power Asymmetry and The Relational View 
Power/dependence relationships it is necessary to have balance, Emerson (1962) commended that if any one 
party attempts to gain more power, then the other party will try to balance that power against its partner. This 
is an ongoing process. Cook and Emerson (1978) stated that the long term effectiveness of power can be 
seen as a control mechanism. Indeed, they were of the opinion that the powerful party will exploit the 
weaker party meaning that there is imbalanced power in the relationship, thus resulting in less cooperation 
and high levels of conflict (Dwyer et al., 1987).  
The buyer relationships that have developed are large company dominated with a focus on cost reduction 
rather than responsiveness with trust and commitment not easily achieved (Johnsen and Ford, 2006). Trust 
and commitment are critical to the development of mutually beneficial relationships (van Hoek, 2000). 
Johnsen et al. (2006; after Sako, 1998) identify varying levels of trust which emerge as commitment 
develops. Johnsen and Ford (2008) have found that power asymmetries affect the direction of relationships 
and buyers and suppliers change their position in term of this effect in long term relationships. Weaker party 
might have difficulties to build its own business goals, but to follow the stronger parties’ decisions. 
Furthermore, power asymmetry jeopardises relationship development process efforts of weaker party 
because weaker parties gain power and overcome asymmetries as the relationship develops (Lee and 
Johnsen, 2012).  
Power Types  
Katsikeas et al. (2000:187) divided the literature on power into two distinct areas; coercive and non-coercive 
power. Non-coercive power is identified as building upon rewards, being legitimate, and referent, expert and 
informational. Coercive power uses penalty rather than reward to control another party (Benton and Maloni, 
2005, and Terpent and Ashenbaum, 2012). However, Gaski (1986) has criticised this classification because 
it was ignoring the other effects and use of power in supply chain relationships. Moreover, power 
asymmetries has been considered as close to coerciveness, because coercive power take place if there is a 
low level of commitment and conflicting relationships where one party is strongly dependent on the other 
(Dwyer, 1980, Ford et al., 2003). On the other hand, it diminishes the chance of cooperation between parties 
and long term successes. As opposed to coercive power, non-coercive power affects the relationship 
positively by increasing the motivation, cooperation and offering more negotiation opportunities for the 
weaker party (Lacoste and Johnsen, 2014). However, our knowledge of power is still limited in supply chain 
relationships (Meehan and Wright, 2012). In addition to this, there is a limited understanding the use of 
powerinfast fashion particularly. 
Self and Collective Interests  
In dyadic relationships, effectiveness and beneficial results are related to behaviour and actions of both 
parties. However, conflicts are unavoidable in relationships so that they may likely to increase the level of 
checks over each other and controls in the relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989). Business goal alignment is 
highly preferred because it provides a synergy and efficiency in activities of both parties in the relationships, 
in addition, when the complexity increases in relationships, managing alignment even become more 
important (Corsaro & Snehota, 2011). Self-interest can be defined the act of following and protecting one’s 
own rights, on the other hand, collective interest is combining interests of both parties in a relationship 
(Medlin,2006). In this study, the interaction perspective leads us to explore how an interest of each party is 
related to business goal development, retailers and suppliers may have different interest in their cooperative 
business activities because of dissimilar resources. 
Supplier Capabilities and Power Asymmetry 
The capability of a firm is its ability to achieve against the hostility of circumstance or strong competition 
(Mintzberg and Quinn 1992). In dyadic relationships interaction utilize the capabilities of a company but 
may also determine their alteration or development over time (Ford, Hakansson and Johanson, 
1986).Nevertheless, in asymmetrical relationships, suppliers’ capabilities may be employed by the customers 
to gain benefit and alterations may only be permitted when customers have need of (Johnsen and Ford, 
2002). Furthermore, Johnsen and Ford (2006) have found that small firms often have strengths and 
capabilities relied upon by the more powerful partner in the relationship. Similarly, small firms may 
influence the nature of relationships with buyers towards more symmetrical state by mainly focusing on the 
priorities of customers these are important to the relationships and offers competitive advantage and 
developing expertise in particular areas (Caniels and Gelderman, 2007). In self and collective interests of 
parties would be strongly related to their capabilities, this leads us to explore the relationship between these 
two concepts in this study.  
 
Research Design and Methods 
 
Why the apparel supply chain in Turkey  
Since 1996, there have been no trade restrictions or duty payable for any EU trade with Turkey, a major 
supplier of textiles and clothing (Hauge, Oxborrow, and McAtamney, 2001). Turkey is the world’s sixth 
biggest ready wear and apparel manufacturer and the European Union’s second-largest supplier after China. 
Its textile industry is the world’s tenth biggest and the European Union’s number one supplier (Trade and 
Investment Centre, 2015). As the world’s fourth largest clothing exporter, Turkish apparel suppliers have 
developed key competencies that have enabled strong partnerships with other geographically distant buyers 
(Tokatli and Kizilgün, 2009). 
Qualitative Data Collection and Sampling 
The research design adopts a multiple exploratory case study approach (Yin, 2003) to enable rich data to be 
gathered on the experiences of self and collective interests in asymmetric apparel supply chains.The research 
project will take a qualitative approach to overcome some of the methodological challenges associated with 
studying small supplier firms. Primary data was collected through twelve interviews with six small apparel 
firms. The same participants were interviewed twice due to maintain the consistency in data collection and 
gathering the complete set of knowledge from experts. first interview analysis enabled us to explore further 
into self and collective interests of small apparel suppliers and their strategies. Participants all had five or 
more years of experience in production processes and supply chain relations with the companies they trade. 
Therefore, they were able to provide depth answers to our interview questions. Participants’ companies are 
all situated in Istanbul in Turkey. Istanbul Textile Export Association (ITKIB)’s membership data based 
were used for selecting suitable apparel firms. Three selection criteria were used in the selection of 
participant firms: a) regular exporters, b) member of ITKIB, and c) small apparel supplier firms. 
 Data Analysis 
NVivo 11 qualitative data analysis software was used to conduct data analysis. Interviews were tape- 
recorded and transcribed and the data collected in Turkey was translated into English. Interviews were in-
depth and semi-structured, lasted between 45 minutes to 75 minutes. The transcripts were annotated to 
generate first level coding (Miles and Huberman, 1994). A coding tree was generated, based on emerging 
themes arising from the interviews based on codes for the further steps in reducing, displaying and 
interpreting the analysed data. The analytical approach was chosen in this research to relate the interview 
data to research question using themes derived from data analysis. The analysis resulted in a number of 
common issues, including those raised by the apparel suppliers themselves in discussion, as well as those 
apparent in, or in contrast to the literature. These common patterns will be discussed in findings and 
discussion. 
 
Findings  
 
Initial findings of this study have highlighted that self and collective interests of retailers and apparel 
suppliers are evident in the area of capability development, production processes and innovation in 
asymmetric relationships in order to achieve desired goals of both retailers and apparel suppliers. On the 
other hand, these areas of interest are determined by the retailer type and supply type, which is required from 
apparel suppliers. In the literature, retailers have been classified in three main categories: specialist, 
department stores and groceries (See Table 1). In this study, we have identified that retailer buyers of apparel 
suppliers that we interviewed are fit in this category  
 
Capability Development 
 
Specialist Retailers: developing capabilities of apparel suppliers have been considered as the most important 
areas in asymmetric relationships because specialist retailers are on the high end of the retailer spectrum and 
they offer branded products to their customers in highly competitive market. Therefore, capability 
development has been encouraged and supported by the retailers otherwise; retailers would not control the 
promised quality and service standards in highly competitive markets. These retailers use their expert non-
coercive power to develop collective interest to help and support certain capability development for their 
suppliers such as technical, and managerial. Their orders are high variant and require scheduled time 
delivery in that suppliers would be playing important role in the performance and competitiveness of the 
retailer. Production process is another area that specialist retailers develop self-interest by using their 
coercive punishment power because there was not any chance to change or reverse manufactured apparels. 
On the other hand, innovation was the area of both parties willing to develop collective interest, which 
would offer retailer competitive advantage and supplier to have longer relationship with the retailer, retailers 
use non-coercive reward and information power to add value to their own performance and competitive 
advantage.    
 
Department Stores: developing capabilities of suppliers are also important determinant for department store 
type of retailers but department stores were not willing to develop collective interest in asymmetric 
relationships with suppliers in capability development and production processes, they were more interested 
in pursuing self-interest in the asymmetric relationships. They mainly used coercive power over their 
suppliers because department stores required low variant and flexible time delivery. However, quality was 
the most important thing that is attached to their brand image in the market thus; there was little tolerance to 
any mistakes in the production processes. Their market is not as competitive as specialist retailers are. They 
were focusing on larger segments in the market and less competitive products. However, they preferred 
developing collective interest with apparel suppliers in innovation because they always want to outsource 
considerably new but cost effective supply from apparel suppliers. They mainly use non-coercive reward 
power for innovation related collective interest.     
 
Groceries: They were mainly interested in cost and quantity in their relationships. Their orders are low to 
mid variant and quantities were very high compare to specialist and department store because they have 
large stores and they are on the low end of apparel market. Therefore, self-interest development in 
relationships with supplier was evident and they mainly use coercive punishment power in their relationships 
with apparel suppliers. They were the dominant power in this category with low quality requirements. 
Capability development and production process efficiency were mainly seen the tasks for apparel supplier 
and relationship investment was very high for apparel suppliers. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
Retailer-supplier relationships in apparel industry are asymmetric and increasing power of retailers are 
evident (Oxborrow and Brindley, 2014). However, increasing power of retailers in asymmetric relationships 
have also been found in this study as beneficial for apparel suppliers that supply to specialist and department 
store type retailers. Asymmetry offers development opportunities and benefits for apparel suppliers in the 
areas of capability development, production processes and innovation Meehan and Wright (2012), and 
developing collective interest with retailers (Corsaro & Snehota, 2011). Furthermore, we found that  
coercive and non-coercive power use influenced business activities of small supplier firms by restricting, 
limiting, attracting and encouraging them in order pursue collective and self-interests in asymmetric 
relationships in line with (Medlin,2006 and Pulles 2014). 
Power use of retailers are related to the increasing dominance, resources and position in the supply chain 
Meehan and Wright (2012). In addition to this, we have found that retailer type; specialist, department store 
and groceries, and supply type; low variant and high variant orders versus limited and flexible time 
requirements of orders influence power use including coercive and non-coercive in the areas of capability 
development, production processes and innovation. 
Building on interaction view, we start to explore how retailers use power in self and collective interests in 
asymmetric relationships with small apparel suppliers? Our findings have also important implications for 
retailers and apparel suppliers. Retailers should realise that being in a powerful position is also related 
choosing and working with competent suppliers, their developing capabilities and competencies would be 
very important determinants for competitive advantage and performance. On the other hand, apparel 
suppliers should understand the requirements of their buyers and their market conditions in asymmetric 
relationships and seek to involve development of collective interests with them. This is important finding in 
this study that fast fashion suppliers need to understand the concept of power and its use by retailers in terms 
of capabilities, production process and innovation.   
Furthermore, the findings in this study indicated that power use in self and collective interests in asymmetric 
relationships are related to capability development, production processes and innovation. These aspects can 
be seen to be instances of a broader recognizable set of asymmetric relationships. Self and collective 
interests of parties irrespective to supply chain and country might be still challenging for small suppliers in 
relationships with retailers as a result of integrating global supply chains and an undeniable fact of power 
swift from suppliers to retailers globally. Integration of global supply chains provides advantages to the fast 
fashion retailers such as cost, faster product development cycle and higher quality advantages that they 
cannot refuse to accept. On the other hand, parallel market demands in more customisation manifest those 
retailers to fill the demand in similar ways through integrated global supply chains. Therefore, self and 
collective interests in fast fashion supply chain relations may be recognized as important relational 
constructs for defining and understanding retailer and supplier relationships in fast fashion supply chains.   
In this study, we explored self and collective goal development in asymmetric relationships by collecting 
data from apparel suppliers point of view but the future studies would explore the same phenomenon from 
both retailer and supplier sides to have a full clear picture of the dynamics of power use and its determinants. 
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Table 1. Retailer Types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pearson Education (2015) and Hines and McGovan (2005).  
 
 
Table 2: Company Profiles and Key Informants  
 
 Interviewed  Company type Turn over  Productio
n  
Customer
s 
Number 
of 
Employe
es 
Compan
y 1 
General Manager 
and Board 
Member 
 
Manufacturer 
exporter 
40-50 million 
dollars yearly  
Circular 
knitting 
garment 
(sportswea
r) 
Specialist  
 
Departme
nt stores   
 
250 
Compan
y 2 
General Manager 
and owner 
 
Manufacturer  
exporter 
30 million 
dollars yearly 
Knitwear 
for woman 
and kids 
(Jumper, 
socks, 
cardigan) 
Specialist 
Departme
nt store 
Grocer 
240 
Compan
y 3 
General Manager 
and owner 
Manufacturer 
Outsourcer  
Exporter 
15 million 
dollars yearly 
Knitwear  
(T-shirts, 
polo 
shirts, 
sweatshirt
s, tops, 
jersey 
jackets, 
jersey 
pants, 
dresses, 
skirts) 
Specialist 
Departme
nt store 
150 
Specialists: feature narrow product lines, 
with deep assortments 
 
Department stores: offer a wide variety of 
product lines of clothing, home furnishings, 
household goods 
 
Grocers (supermarkets): usually carry a 
relatively large variety of low-cost, low 
margin groceries and consumables 
 
Compan
y 4   
General Manager 
and Part-Owner 
Manufacturer 
Exporter 
20 million 
dollars yearly 
Printing, 
embroider
y, Fabric 
Knitting 
and 
Cutting; 
all done in 
one house 
(Mid age 
woman 
and man 
fancy and 
luxury  
dress) 
Specialist  130 
Compan
y 5 
General Manager 
and Owner 
Manufacturer  
Exporter 
15 million 
dollar yearly 
Knitting  
Socks for 
all genders 
Specialist  
Departme
nt store   
 
200 
Compan
y  
6 
General Manager 
and Owner 
Manufacturer  
Exporter 
5-10 million 
dollar yearly  
Shirt  Specialist  50 
 
 
